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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1107 
___________ 
 
PANKAJ HARIBHA AGRAWAL, 
     Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A030-897-334) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter Durling 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 13, 2013 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 16, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pankaj Haribha Agrawal petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ (“BIA” or “Board”) dismissal of his appeal.  For the following reasons, we will 
deny the petition for review. 
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 Agrawal, a citizen of India, was admitted into the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident in 1974.  In 2009, in the District of New Jersey, Agrawal was 
convicted of distribution of oxycodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and money 
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957.  In April 2010, Agrawal was served with a 
Notice to Appear charging him with being removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
on the basis of an aggravated felony conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance.  
At a hearing before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Agrawal conceded that he was 
removable as charged, and the IJ ordered him removed to India.  At that time, Agrawal 
had not applied for any form of relief.  He waived his appeal to the BIA. 
 Approximately two years later, in September 2012, Agrawal filed a motion to 
reopen, asserting (1) that he was denied a fundamentally fair hearing when the IJ failed to 
inform him of all available relief, and (2) that he was persecuted in the past and had a fear 
of future persecution if returned to India.  He attached to his motion an application for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”).  The IJ denied his motion, concluding that Agrawal was ineligible for 
discretionary relief, asylum, and withholding of removal because of his aggravated felony 
drug trafficking conviction.  The IJ also concluded that while Agrawal could pursue 
deferral of removal under the CAT, he had never informed the IJ that he was persecuted 
in the past or feared torture in the future. 
 Agrawal appealed the denial of his motion to reopen to the BIA.  The BIA 
dismissed his appeal, noting that Agrawal’s motion to reopen was untimely, and that he 
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did not allege that the motion was eligible for a timeliness exception based on “changed 
country conditions” in India since the date of his hearing before the IJ.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.23(b)(4)(i).  The BIA further concluded that “an intervention of the [IJ’s] or [the 
BIA’s] sua sponte authority to reopen the proceedings” was not warranted.  A.R. 2.  This 
petition for review followed. 
Generally, we lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against an alien, 
like Agrawal, who is removable for having been convicted of certain criminal offenses.  8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  We also lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s or Board’s unfettered 
discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).  Cruz v. Att’y 
Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2006).  We retain jurisdiction, however, to review any 
constitutional or legal questions raised in Agrawal’s petition for review.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).  
Agrawal’s sole argument regarding the timeliness of his motion to reopen is this:  
“[T]he BIA [sic] contention that he must file his motion to reopen with 90 days from the 
date he was ordered deported is righ [sic] in a way, but flatly wrong under the present 
situation.”  Petitioner’s Brief at 2.  Agrawal seems to suggest that the IJ’s failure to 
inform him of relief for which he might be eligible creates an exception to the timeliness 
requirements, but Agrawal does not cite any authority for this suggestion, and we are 
aware of none.  The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding the motion to reopen 
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untimely.
1
   Because we lack jurisdiction to consider whether the IJ and BIA properly 
decided not to exercise their authority to reopen sua sponte, we cannot reach the other 
issues Agrawal raises. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
                                              
1
 In his reply brief, Agrawal also argues that he should not be faulted with his late filing, 
because he did not learn that persecution of interfaith married couples “have completely 
worsen” since the time of his initial hearing.  Reply Brief at 4.  But he did not argue 
before the IJ or BIA that conditions in India had worsened since the time of his initial 
hearing; in fact, he argued that after he was ordered deported, he contacted a friend who 
told him that the conditions that were “the main reason for his fleeing India 35 years ago 
[are] still prevalent today.”  A.R. 57.  We thus lack jurisdiction to consider the argument.  
8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009). 
